This paper investigates the short-run and long-run performance of Australian cross-listed firms relative to their rivals. The role of share trading liquidity in explaining abnormal returns is also investigated. In the short run, the mean cumulative abnormal returns of between 0.65% to 1.02% are statistically significant for the cross-listed firms during the event window. For the long-run analysis, rival firms experience negative abnormal returns. Further analysis reveals that rival firms tend to have a greater level of negative abnormal returns compared to their cross-listed counterparts. Lastly, liquidity gains are generally found not to be a determinant for cross listed firms' abnormal returns.
Introduction
With the advent of globalisation and deregulation of the financial landscape in the past decade, there has been a surge in cross-border listings by firms. In 1997, nearly 4700 firms cross listed on overseas exchanges globally, with the number of new foreign listings of around 1000 for that year (World Federation of Exchanges, 2008) . Popular locations for foreign listing included the UK, the US and Japan. A decade later, the number of cross-listed firms had declined to 2837 firms in 2006, while the number of new foreign listings fell to 299, nearly a third of the 1997 levels.
Several key questions arise from this interesting trend. What motivates firms to go overseas to raise capital? Researchers have debated this question since the early 1990s when international equity listing or 'cross listing' was gaining popularity. Among the argued benefits that cross listings create are reduced cost of capital, broadening of the shareholder base, increased liquidity and the bonding of firms to a stronger legal framework (Karolyi, 2006; King & Mittoo, 2007) . However, international equity raising attracts costs as well. These include those associated with adherence to the overseas exchange's regulatory and accounting framework, additional reporting costs and underwriting fees.
If there are net positive benefits of cross-listing which accrue to these firms, the number of international equity listings should be increasing over the years. The declining trend of cross-listing highlighted above raises the question of whether the benefits of internationalisation are enduring in the long term or are they transitory in nature. In other words, are there permanent gains to cross-list overseas?
Another perspective on cross-listing is the potential effects that it has on the other firms in the industry. While it is clear that seeking shareholder interest overseas could possibly bring benefits to the cross-listed firm, there could be spillover effects on the other domestic firms in the industry of the cross-lister. According to Melvin & Valero (2008) , the act of going overseas could possibly alter the competitive landscape of the industry as cross-listing firms are perceived to be at an advantage relative to non-cross listed rivals in the home market. It is therefore reasonable to conjecture that the remaining firms in the industry would be affected to a certain extent as prior studies have shown.
1 Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to examine the impact of cross listing on the short-and long-run performances of cross listed firms in comparison to their rival firms in the Australian context. Additionally, this paper also investigates the impact of cross listing on liquidity.
Given that Australia is a small domestic capital market, any change in liquidity is expected to be advantageous for cross-listed Australian firms.
This study will contribute to the literature in several ways. First, the Australian market is an interesting research setting because, despite being a developed economy, gains are still expected from cross listing due to the shallower nature of its capital markets compared to the US and London markets. 2 Yet, studies on Australian firms' cross listing activity are relatively scarce. Second, this study will contribute to the growing body of literature on the long-run impact of cross listing. This allows a comparison of both short-and long-run benefits of cross listing and shed some light on the possible reasons behind the recent trend reversal in cross listing. Third, studies on cross listing emphasise the effects of cross listing on listing firm and often do not seek to 1 See Bradford et al. (2002) and Melvin & Valero (2008) . 2 This is evident from the cross listing of Australian firms overseas. Firms such as BHP Billiton and major banks such as National Australia Bank have gone overseas in search of more capital (Ahmed et al., 2006) . compare the effect with rival firms. To date, only a few studies (Bradford et al., 2002; Melvin & Valero, 2008) The remained of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review, while Section 3 outlines the data and research method. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review

Performance of Cross-Listed Firms
Prior literature on cross listing focuses on the short-run performance of the listing firms. Foerster & Karolyi (1999) utilise a sample of 183 American Depository Receipts (ADR) and ordinary listings in the US and find a listing week abnormal return of 1%. Mittoo (2003) analyses Canadian firms which cross listed in the US markets during the period 1976 to 1998 and finds a 1.9% mean abnormal return during listing week.
In the long run, however, the performance of cross-listed firms tells a different story. Foreign firms listing in the US are found to underperform the local market benchmarks by 8 to 15% in the following three years of cross listing (Foerster & Karolyi, 2000) . A similar result is evident in the study of Canadian firms by Mittoo (2003) . In a similar vein, Sarkissian & Schill (2009) 
Theories on the Benefits of Cross Listing
Market Segmentation
One of the theories developed to explain the abnormal performance of cross-listed firms is the market segmentation theory. Firms internationalise to overcome investment barriers that they face in domestic markets and to diversify risk (Mittoo, 1992; Bancel & Mittoo, 2001 ). The presence of investment barriers in domestic markets hinders access to overseas capital thereby limiting growth of the firms. By listing in an overseas market, firms are able to access foreign capital and increase exposure to global market factors.
The ultimate result is diversification through risk sharing thereby reducing the cost of raising capital. Amihud & Mendelson (1986) develop an asset pricing model which shows that returns of securities are an increasing concave function of liquidity. Consequently, increasing liquidity results in higher valuation and returns. By listing in multiple and larger markets, firms are able to enjoy more liquidity due to increased trading volume, exposure and reduced trading costs (Hargis, 2000; Domowitz et al., 1998) . In fact, managers have cited increased liquidity as one of the motivations to list in foreign markets (Mittoo, 1992; Bancel & Mittoo, 2001 Merton (1987) proposes an equilibrium pricing model of incomplete information. A shadow cost exists due to incomplete information leading to higher expected return for securities due to the higher premium attributed to incomplete information. Cross listing in multiple markets can widen the shareholder base and increase the 'visibility' of firms. As investors become aware of these firms, the premium or shadow cost is reduced leading to higher valuations. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Baker et al. (2002) document results consistent with this investor recognition theory. A wider shareholder base and increased profile enhances liquidity and price discovery in markets.
Liquidity and Multi-market Trading
Investor Recognition
Bonding and Corporate Governance
The bonding theory postulates that cross listing can enhance corporate governance and better protect the rights of minority shareholders (Coffee Jr., 2002; Doidge et al., 2004) .
Firms list in markets covered by tougher legal frameworks and disclosure rules thereby 'bonding' themselves to more effective legal institutions. This attracts more investors especially those concerned with tunneling and disclosure issues. According to Doidge et al. (2004) , investors in the US are well protected relative to other countries globally.
Reduced expropriation of minority shareholders by the dominant shareholders frees up resources for growth funding, thereby leading to higher firm valuation.
Home Market Rivals and Spill-over Effects
Cross listing is argued to confer positive effects onto the listing firm and is perceived to affect the competitive landscape of industries. Since these proposed advantages only accrue to firms that internationalize, non-cross listing firms in the same industry are perceived to be disadvantaged. Stulz (1999) argues that firms cross list to signal to investors and distinguish themselves from 'losers'. Prior studies document support for the existence of adverse spillover effects brought about by cross listing. Levine & Schmukler (2007) find a negative spillover effect of liquidity on remaining non-cross listed home market firms. Melvin & Valero (2008) analyse the spillover effects of cross listing on the home market rivals using a sample of 14 US cross-listed firms between 1986 and 2002 and find that rival firms in the home markets declined in performance.
Australian Firms and Cross Listing
On the Australian front, cross listing studies are limited. Faff et al. (2002) analyse the performance 1 year pre and post cross listing for 22 Australian firms cross listed overseas as at 1996. They utilise a multivariate GARCH model in computing abnormal returns.
For the 20-day period post listing, they find significant negative abnormal returns and no significant return in the 1 year post listing. Mixed results for cost of capital reduction are also documented. They offer market timing and insider knowledge as explanations. Ahmed et al. (2006) utilising bootstrapping methods, study Australian firms cross listing overseas from 1980 to 2000, they find results that are consistent with Faff et al. (2002) .
This highlights the potential influence of country specific factors on performance related to cross listing. The impact of cross listing appears to be complex and could differ if overseas exchanges other than US are the cross listing destination. As such, it would be interesting to analyse cross listing using the Australian firms to ascertain whether there is value creation for firms to cross list overseas.
Data and Method
Data
A search is performed on Datastream to identify all possible listings of Australian firms' on various exchanges. Then, the host exchange websites are searched for cross-listed firms and listing dates. However, not all exchange websites provide foreign firm statistics. 4 For these exchanges, the research department of the exchange is contacted directly to obtain the required data.
If the cross listing dates are unavailable from the host exchange website, the dates are identified from Aspect Huntley's DatAnalysis database, annual reports, online news articles or company web pages. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find no significant difference between using announcement and listing dates in their cross listing study. As such, the listing dates are used for this study due to data constraints. The initial sample is 192 cross-listed firms. The initial sample is then filtered against several criteria. Specifically, to be included in the sample, a firm must have: (1) the Australia Securities Exchange (ASX) as the home exchange and (2) a foreign market listing that is exchange traded.
Over-the-counter listings, level 1 ADRs, 5 and other non-exchange traded listings are excluded to be consistent with prior research (Foerster & Karolyi, 1999) . The primary reason for exclusion is that non-exchange traded foreign listings do not have disclosure and reporting obligations that are as high as the main or second board exchange listings.
The sample of cross-listed firms is also filtered for investment funds and preference shares due to differing operating activities. New Zealand as a cross listing destination for Australian firms may be due to proximity preference. Sarkissian & Schill (2004) suggested that such preference is due to familiarity because there is additional information flow between countries with similar culture and close geographical proximity. 
Method
Short Run Analysis
Following Foerster & Karolyi (1999) and Melvin & Valero (2008) , an event study approach is employed to examine the share price reaction of firms surrounding the crosslisting event. Cross listing dates are used as the event dates. An event window of (-15, +15) is used with a 100-day estimation period to proxy for 1 month performance. To estimate abnormal returns, a domestic market model is employed. The market model is given in Eq.(1):
where R i is the return of the firm, and R m is the market return proxied by the returns on the All Ordinaries Index.
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To test the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns, a Z-test is employed.
However, there is potential for the Z-test statistic to be misspecified if returns are not normally distributed. Thus, the non-parametric Cowan sign test is also employed to complement the analysis. The event study analysis is then repeated for the rival firms.
Long Run Analysis -Calendar Time Approach
According to Mitchell & Stafford (2000) using Buy Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) or Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS) in measuring long-term performance is flawed because these methods assume independence of cross sectional returns. Therefore, a calendar time approach is employed in this study.
The calendar time approach involves the creation and rebalancing of a portfolio of the firms relevant to the given research question. The period covered is from the earliest cross listing event until the latest within the sample. The portfolio of cross listed firms is rebalanced every month to include firms that have just experienced an event (cross listing) while firms that have been in the portfolio for 36 months (3 years) are dropped.
The monthly returns on the portfolio are calculated on a value weighted basis. Returns are defined as returns in excess of risk free rate. To test the post 36 months cross listing performance, the monthly returns over the period of analysis (earliest cross listing to the latest) is then regressed on a constant (alpha) and the domestic market's excess return (All Ordinaries Index), as shown in Eq.(2). The alpha is interpreted as the abnormal returns. The analysis is repeated for the rival firms.
Two-factor International Asset Pricing Model (IAPM)
Foerster & Karolyi (1999) 
where:
R it -R ft = stock i returns in excess of Australian risk free-rate for month t. 
R Aus t -R
Cross Sectional Analysis on the Abnormal Returns of Cross Listed Firms
The cross section model is defined in Eq.(4). Eq(3) is regressed for each individual firm to obtain the dependent variables for the cross section analysis. For the short-run analysis, the dependent variable employed in Eq. (4) 
The test variable in the cross sectional regression is ΔSPREAD. To document the effects of changes in liquidity, if any, in explaining the possible gains or declines of cross listing, ΔSPREAD is constructed following Kadlec & McConnell (1994) . ΔSPREAD represents the change in spread percentage (SP%) before and after cross listing. The spread percentage is calculated as:
where Bid and Ask is the daily closing bid and ask prices of a firm's stock. (Ask-bid)
represents the absolute bid-ask spread which is essentially the transaction cost. It is then divided by the midpoint which is assumed to approximate the actual share price. The aim is to obtain the percentage of the transaction cost relative to the most likely share price.
To construct ΔSPREAD for the short run, the average spread percentage for the month before the listing month is subtracted from the average spread percentage of the month following listing month as in Kadlec and McConnell (1994) . For the long-run cross sectional analysis, the ΔSPREAD is estimated as the 12 months average spread percentage before listing (months -12 to -1) subtracted from the average spread percentage for the third year (months +25 to +36) following cross listing month. The more liquid a security is, the higher the price (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) . As a particular stock experiences increased liquidity, the bid-ask spread would tighten to reflect the decline in trading costs, leading to higher valuation. Thus, a negative relation is expected between ΔSPREAD and the firms abnormal returns because a negative ΔSPREAD would be interpreted as higher liquidity.
Following prior research in cross listing, 8 there are some endogenous factors involved in the cross listing decision. The control variable GROWTH controls for high growth firms in cross listing as higher growth firms are more likely to go overseas to raise funds. This study uses the price to book ratio as a proxy for growth. To control for size effects, the natural log of total assets (SIZE) is used. To control for foreign sales, the proportion of foreign sales to total sales for the fiscal year prior to cross listing is used as per prior literature (Pagano et al., 2002; Melvin & Valero, 2008 Due to potential stock illiquidity and non-normality of sample return distribution problems which are highlighted in the event study methodology literature (MacKinlay, 1997), the non-parametric Cowan's sign test is reported in Table 2 . The Cowan sign tests indicate that the mean CARs on day -1 (1.02%) and on day 0 (0.9%) are statistically significant at the 1 % and 5% levels, respectively. Furthermore, for the 3 days surrounding the cross listing date (-1, +1) the sign test indicates significance of mean cumulative abnormal returns of 0.65% at the 5% level. This finding is consistent with Foerster & Karolyi (1999) and Melvin & Valero (2008) in which a small gain of approximately 1% around the time of listing is experienced by cross-listing firms.
Results and Discussions
Short-run Analysis
The event study is also conducted on the rival firms and the results are also reported in Table 2 . No significant abnormal returns were recorded across the whole event window for the rival firms. The results for the rival firms are inconsistent with the findings in Melvin & Valero (2008) where they find that home market rivals of the crosslisted firms in their US study experience a negative impact when firms cross list. Rival firms are perceived to be negatively affected as they are not in a position to experience the benefits that cross listing is purported to bring. One possible explanation for the Australian results is that while investors react positively to cross listing news, they generally do not view non-cross listed rivals firms as at a disadvantage in the short run.
For a robustness test, the event window is widened to cover 15 more days on either side (-30, +30) of the original event window. The results of the robustness test on the short-run analysis are shown in Table 2 However, the non-parametric test indicates that the 0.1% mean CAR is significant at the 5% level. For the rival firms, the robustness event study results are relatively similar to the (-15 +15) main event study with no significant mean CARs with either parametric or non-parametric tests. For the rival firms, the long-run analysis indicates that the domestic rival firms suffer a negative abnormal return of 1.7% post cross listing 36 months, which is significant at the 5% level. One possible explanation is that increased visibility or profile of the company as a result of cross listing has a negative impact on the rival firms. Rival firms that are not cross listed are seen as missing out on the increased visibility and broader shareholder base in the long run. Kadlec & McConnell (1994) finds strong support for the investor recognition hypothesis proposed by Merton (1987) . This suggests that investors' recognition could be a reason for the negative abnormal returns for rivals in the long run.
Long-run Analysis
As a robustness check of the long-run analysis, Fama & French Factors are incorporated into the calendar time portfolio regression (Eq. 2). The results are reported in Table 3 Panel B. The results are robust and consistent with the main market model regression. The calendar time portfolio alpha does not alter much and is still insignificant at the 5% level. For the rival firms, the negative alpha remains quite similar (now -1.87%) and significant.
For both the market and Fama & French models, the alphas for both cross listed and rival firms were tested for significant difference with a Wald test. The Chi square test statistics indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no statistical difference in both cases at the 1% level. This indicates that in both cases, there are significant differences between the abnormal returns of the cross listed firms and the rivals.  -statistics suggest that there is a significant structural break in the pre-cross listing (months -12, -1) and post-cross listing (months +1, +36) coefficients for both the cross listed firms and their rivals. For both the cross-listed and rival firms, the 1-year prelisting performance (alpha pre) and listing month performance (alpha list) are not statistically significant. The post-cross listing alphas (months +1, +36) indicate that crosslisted firms experience a decline of 2.4%, while the rivals firms in the long run experience a decline of 3.4%.
Two-factor International Asset Pricing Model (IAPM)
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To further examine any possible risk reductions and for robustness purposes, the full sample was divided into sub-samples. Given that firms which cross listed in New Zealand make up a large proportion of the sample, the analysis is repeated for these firms only. There is a post-listing alpha decline of 3.31% for the New Zealand sample.
Surprisingly, the global beta of Australian firms cross listing in New Zealand seems to have decreased significantly at the 5% level. This is surprising given that cross listing should reduce the local beta and increase the global beta as firms become internationally exposed to international market factors. One of the possible explanations for this decline is that New Zealand and Australia have close proximity of market factors in terms of culture, geography and legal framework efficiency as found by La Porta et al. (1998) and Sarkissian & Schill (2004) . The results for the other countries sub-sample are relatively similar to the full sample. Most notably, there is a significant post-listing decline of 4% (significant at the 1% level) for the rival firms for the subsample of cross listing in other countries excluding New Zealand. Table 5 provides the average changes in liquidity for the short run and long run for the cross listed firm sample. 10 The pre cross listing average spread change in the short run (1 month average daily spread %) is 2.9% across 57 firms. The long-run spread (12 months average daily spread %) is 3.5% pre cross listing and 4.03% post cross listing. There is an increase in the average spread % of 28 basis points from 2.92% to 3.2% for the short run and in the long run the increase is 48 basis points. By making the firms' shares available to overseas investors via cross listing, cross-listed firms stand to increase their profile, leading to greater visibility and liquidity of their shares. Tinic & West (1974) and Mittoo (2003) show that bid-ask spread tightens for Canadian firms cross listed in the US. While the increase in Spread % is inconsistent with prior findings of studies conducted in the US and Canada, the changes are not statistically significant. Table 6 provides the cross sectional regression analysis. The results are divided into two panels: Panel A (Panel B) presents the cross sectional regression on the short run (long run) abnormal performance alpha. In the short run (listing month), the ΔSPREAD is not statistically significant. There is a negative relationship between growth and the abnormal performance of the cross listed firms in the short run. This is inconsistent with the extant literature with regard to foreign listing, in which firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to go overseas to cross list (Doidge et al, 2004 , King & Segal, 2009 , Bailey et al., 2006 .
Cross-Sectional Analysis
In the long run univariate analysis (36 month post listing), ΔSPREAD is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that lower ΔSPREAD (trading cost) leads to higher liquidity and, hence, higher abnormal returns. However, when control variables are included in the regression, ΔSPREAD becomes statistically insignificant. This finding is inconsistent with Mittoo's (2003) study where a liquidity gain was a determinant of cross-listing performance in the short run for Canadian firms cross listing in US. A possible reason for this finding in the Australian sample is that varying global cross listing destinations were used and it is likely that different exchanges would have differing liquidity levels leading to different association between liquidity and abnormal returns. For example, firms are expected to benefit from liquidity gain to a greater extent if they cross list in the US as compared to in New Zealand. Australian firms might have different motivations for going overseas such as increasing profile and raising capital.
Conclusions
This paper seeks to examine the impact of cross listing on Australian firms in the short and long run and spillover effects on domestic rivals. The role of liquidity as a determinant of abnormal performance of cross listing is also investigated. The short run event study analysis indicates that there is a small listing gain of between 0.65% to 1.02%
during the event window. For the long run analysis, cross listed firms are found to have no significant abnormal returns. This is in line with the current literature on long-term performance that finds no permanent gains arising from cross listing. Rival firms on the other hand, experience negative abnormal returns in the long run. For the analysis based on an international asset pricing model, there are no significant abnormal returns for both cross-listed and rival firms during the listing month. However, both cross-listed and rival firms have significant negative abnormal returns in the long run, with rival firms displaying a greater level of negative abnormal returns.
A cross-sectional analysis is also conducted to investigate whether liquidity change is one of the determinants of cross-listing performance (abnormal returns).
Results from the cross sectional regression suggest that liquidity gain is not a significant factor in explaining abnormal returns for cross listing in either the short run or the long run.
Overall, the results suggest that Australian firms seeking to raise funds overseas should reconsider their cross-listing motives by weighing up the costs and benefits of cross listing. Since the cross listing gains are temporary in nature, investors should not overreact and bid up the stock prices beyond the fair value upon cross listing of a firm.
Also, the findings of our study indicate that domestic rival managers might need to consider changes in the competitive landscape within the industry as there is evidence that non-cross listed home market rivals are negatively affected in the long run. The regression is performed on 57 observations. ** denotes significance at the 1% level and * denotes significance at the 5% level.
